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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 14-3426 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CARLOS VARGAS, 
                              Appellant  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-13-cr-00396-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 3, 2015) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Carlos Vargas (“Appellant”) pled guilty to one count of failing to appear to serve a 
sentence, for which the District Court imposed a sentence of fourteen months’ 
imprisonment.  Appellant now attacks both the substantive and procedural reasonableness 
of that sentence.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
of conviction. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Appellant was arrested when he received delivery of two bags of coffee, which 
concealed 1,070 grams of cocaine.  Following his arrest, Appellant admitted that he had 
been paid to retrieve the packages and that he had done so on approximately four prior 
occasions.  Appellant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 500 
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  He received a sentence of two 
years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.  Following his custodial term, 
while on supervised release, Appellant failed four drug tests and pled guilty to violating 
the terms of his supervised release.  Several months later, two additional drug tests came 
back positive for cocaine.  Appellant again pled guilty to violating the terms of his 
supervised release and received a sentence of ten months’ imprisonment.  Appellant 
failed to self-surrender, as the court had ordered.  As a consequence, he was charged 
with, and pled guilty to, knowingly failing to surrender for service of sentence, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2).  
 Appellant was subject to a Sentencing Guidelines range of between eight and 
fourteen months based upon a total offense level of nine and a criminal history category 
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of III.  Appellant did not object to the Guidelines range, but requested leniency based on 
his medical condition and age.  At the time of sentencing, Appellant was sixty-seven 
years old and had been undergoing treatment for a degenerative eye condition.  As such, 
he sought a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range.  The Government argued for 
a sentence at or above the middle of the Guidelines range because of the seriousness of 
the offense, Appellant’s criminal history, including eleven prior convictions, some of 
which were for violent crimes, and deterrence.  The District Court sentenced Appellant to 
fourteen months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to his original ten month 
sentence.  
II. ANALYSIS1  
 We review sentences “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).  “[W]e are to ensure that a substantively 
reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).2   
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
 2 When no objection is made in the District Court, sentencing procedure is 
reviewed for plain error.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(en banc).  However, “[b]ecause defendants sentenced before the issuance of [Flores-
Mejia] had not been warned that they had a duty to object to the sentencing court’s 
procedural error after sentencing, we will not apply this new rule retroactively and will, 
instead, review for abuse of discretion.  Applying that standard, we have held that a 
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to give ‘meaningful consideration’ to an 
argument advanced by the defendant.”  Id. at 259.  Flores-Mejia was issued on the same 
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 Under our three-step sentencing framework, district courts must: (1) “calculate a 
defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before [United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)],” (2) “‘formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and 
stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure,’” and (3) “‘exercise[] [their] 
discretion by considering the relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors’. . . in setting the 
sentence they impose regardless [of] whether it varies from the sentence calculated under 
the Guidelines.”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196, 194 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Under the third step, the 
District Court “must ‘acknowledge and respond to any properly presented sentencing 
argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.’”  Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 
at 256 (quoting United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 Although Appellant asserts that the District Court failed to adequately consider his 
age, medical condition and history of substance abuse at sentencing, the sentencing 
judge’s reasoning demonstrates proper consideration of these § 3553(a) factors.  After 
noting that the parties did not dispute the offense level and criminal history category, the 
sentencing judge discussed the statutory factors, including Appellant’s age, criminal 
history, “drug problems,” and “health problems.”  (App. 59.)  He also considered the 
offense “a serious crime,” requiring “general deterrence” in order to “send a message to 
                                                                                                                                                             
day as Appellant’s sentencing.  Because Appellant did not have notice of the new 
standard prior to his sentencing, review for abuse of discretion is proper.   
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people [that] they can’t just decide on their own that they’d rather not show up in jail 
when they’re supposed to be there.”  (Id. at 60.)  The sentencing judge invoked the “need 
to protect the public,” because “[t]here[] [was] no doubt . . . that there’s a serious risk that 
[Appellant is] going to commit other crimes.”  (Id.)  The District Court determined that 
Appellant’s criminal history was the “most significant [thing] about his background,” and 
concluded that “a sentence at the high end of the Guideline[s] range is necessary because 
of the statutory factors.”  (Id. at 59-60.).  Here, the sentencing judge articulated his 
reasons for weighing the factors as he did and imposed a sentence based on the proper 
criminal history category.3  As such, there was no procedural error. 
 We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  Our review of 
the application of the § 3553(a) factors considers the totality of the circumstances and is 
highly deferential.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).   
Moreover, “[w]e may not substitute our judgment for the sentencing court’s.”  United 
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007).  Indeed, even if this Court would 
have imposed a different sentence, we must not do so as long as any reasonable court 
could have imposed the given sentence.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Although Appellant 
sought a split sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, the District Court properly 
                                                 
3 Appellant’s argument that the District Court gave improper consideration to old 
or remote criminal convictions lacks merit.  While the District Court stated that “Criminal 
History Category III doesn’t quite capture [Appellant’s] history of crimes,” there is no 
evidence in the record that the District Court improperly based its sentence on that 
history.  (App. 59-60.)   
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considered the statutory factors in imposing a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range.  
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-59 (2007); Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196 (the 
district court’s explanation must be “sufficient for us to see that the particular 
circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration within the 
parameters of § 3553(a)”).  Thus, this sentence is not substantively unreasonable. 
III. CONCLUSION  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction. 
 
 
